Automatic effects of illness schema activation on behavioral manifestations of illness. by Orbell, Sheina & Henderson, Caroline J
AUTOMATIC ILLNESS BEHAVIOR 1 
 
 
 
 
  
Automatic Effects of Illness Schema Activation on Behavioral Manifestations of Illness 
 
 
 
Sheina Orbell and Caroline J. Henderson 
 
University of Essex 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT, HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY, 2016 
ISSUE AND PAGINATION NOT YET AVAILABLE: ONLINE FIRST. 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Note: Sheina Orbell and Caroline Henderson, Department of Psychology, University of 
Essex, United Kingdom.  
 
This research was supported by a grant from the ESRC (RES-000-22-2656).  
We are grateful to Roger Deeble for technical assistance and to Ottmar Lipp, Martin Hagger 
and four anonymous reviewers for comments on the manuscript.  
 
Address for correspondence: Sheina Orbell, Department of Psychology, University of Essex, 
Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO43SQ, Essex. Email: sorbell@essex.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTOMATIC ILLNESS BEHAVIOR 2 
 
 
Automatic Effects of Illness Schema Activation on Behavioral Manifestations of Illness 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Objective: Relatively little research has directly evaluated the schematic nature of illness 
representations proposed by the common sense model of illness. Four studies tested the 
hypothesis that illness schema activation leads directly and automatically to behavioral 
manifestations of illness. Methods: Study 1 was a survey (N = 970) that evaluated the 
proposition that the mental representation of common cold symptom experience includes 
functional deviation from the usual prototypical self. Studies 2 and 3 were experiments that 
tested effects of cold schema activation using a subliminal priming paradigm on walking speed 
(Study 2, N = 53) and free recall in a memory task (Study 3, N = 30). Study 4 (N = 65) used a 2 
(cold prime vs. control) X 2  (alternate self vs. control) experimental design to investigate 
attenuation of the effect of the cold prime on free recall. Results: Study 1 confirmed the 
multifactorial nature of functional self-deviations representing the common cold 
symptomology. Studies 2 and 3 showed that participants primed with the common cold schema 
walked more slowly and performed worse on a memory recall task relative to controls in whom 
the schema was not activated. These effects were automatic in the sense that participants were 
not aware of the prime or of this influence. In Study 4, priming an alternative self-identity 
overcame the deleterious effect of automatic common cold schema activation on free recall in a 
memory task. Conclusions: Subliminal activation of a schematic representation of illness  
automatically activates behavioral manifestations of illness.  
 
Keywords: Common sense model, common cold, flu, automatic behavior, symptoms, 
illness, schema, priming, implicit  
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Automatic Effects of Illness Schema Activation on Behavioral Manifestations of 
Illness 
The common sense model (CSM) of self-regulation describes the cognitive processes 
involved in the important process by which an individual may come to recognize that he or she 
is ill (Leventhal, Meyer & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal, Weinman, Leventhal & Phillips, 2008; 
Leventhal, Breland, Mora & Leventhal, 2010; Leventhal, Leventhal & Breland, 2011). A key 
premise of the CSM is the relationship between the perception of stimuli relating to illness and 
the activation of organized knowledge structures (‘schema’) regarding illness. The central 
route to illness identification in the CSM involves the detection of somatic, physical or 
cognitive functional deviation that exceeds normally expected variability from the underlying 
prototype of the usual physical and functional self. The identification of illness follows from 
the activation and matching of the content of the illness schema to symptomatic experience 
(Martin, Rothrock, Leventhal & Leventhal, 2003; Leventhal et al., 2010).  
Content Domains and Structure of Illness Representations in the CSM 
Illness representations comprise five main content domains. Cognitive representations of 
the identity of the condition, the functional deviations from the prototypical self that comprise 
the symptoms and their label (what it is called) together identify an illness. Studies conducted 
in a range of illness contexts have evidenced the prototypical nature of the representation of 
illness symptoms, and shown that illness labels render symptom prototypes salient (Bishop & 
Converse, 1986; Cameron, Leventhal & Leventhal, 1993). Further domains relate to content 
concerning its perceived cause, timeline, perceived consequences and controllability. Illness 
threat is also represented emotionally, in parallel to cognitive representations (Leventhal, 
Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1992). The multidimensional content of explicit illness 
representations has received support in a range of illness contexts using qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies (e.g. Graham, Rose, Hankins, Chalder & Weinman, 2013; Hagger 
& Orbell, 2003, 2005; Heijmans & de Ridder, 1998; Meyer, Leventhal & Gutman, 1985; 
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Moss-Morris et al. 2002). In relation to structure, Leventhal proposes that illness 
representations are schematically organized knowledge structures. Although illness schema 
may often be consciously processed, recent studies have provided preliminary evidence that 
illnesses are represented as schemata that are specific, implicit and organized. Williams, 
Wasserman and Lotto (2003) suggested that a general illness schema might be activated in 
participants who wrote about their last illness experience. Participants subsequently presented 
with a modified Stroop color-naming task containing general illness related words (e.g. poorly) 
showed greater color naming latencies to words related to illness over neutral words. 
Henderson, Hagger & Orbell (2007) showed that an illness specific prime activated an illness 
specific knowledge structure. A common cold prime resulted in heightened perceptual 
awareness of words associated with the common cold, but not to words associated with 
cardiovascular disease, presented in a subsequent Stroop task. These data support an implicit 
association between an illness label and other concepts contained in an illness schema. 
Henderson, Orbell & Hagger (2009) further demonstrated that information about coping 
procedures is encoded with other aspects of an illness representation. Participants subliminally 
primed by the word “Flu” demonstrated greater responsiveness to words associated with 
previously-elicited typical means for coping with the illness (e.g. “lozenge”) in a grammatical 
decision task, but only if they were habitual users of the strategy when experiencing a cold. 
Findings indicate that frequent co-activation of the illness schema and coping strategy results 
in the coping strategy being encoded and activated by a subliminal illness prime. Implicit 
illness schemata are dynamic structures, updated by past and ongoing experience and their 
operation does not require the employment of effortful resources.  
Priming Behavioral Manifestations of Illness 
 The present research concerns the effect of subliminal illness priming on accessibility 
of functional deviation associated with illness. If, as a consequence of frequent co-activation in 
the past, illness labels (and associated information) are encoded with symptomatic deviations, 
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priming an illness should activate behavioral manifestations of illness. This possibility has not 
previously been investigated. Numerous studies have shown that the activation (by priming) of 
traits, goals, stereotypes and other constructs can influence individuals’ behavior (e.g. 
academic performance, walking speed, helping behavior) without their intention or awareness 
(for reviews see e.g. Aarts 2007; Bargh, 2006; Molden, 2014) and recently research has turned 
to consideration of mechanisms that might explain these behavioral effects. Current research 
suggests that primes affect behavior via changes in the active self-concept. People possess a 
vast chronic self-concept, of which only a subset (the active self concept) can be active at any 
given moment. The active self-concept is an important guide to behavior and includes implicit 
automatic components (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The active-self account of priming effects 
(Wheeler, DeMarree & Petty, 2007; Smeester, Wheeler & Kay, 2010) proposes that, in general, 
primes induce changes within the active-self by making dominant those particular aspects of 
one’s self knowledge that are associated with the respective prime. For example, Hundhammer 
& Mussweiler (2012; study 4) showed that a sex prime led men to act more assertively to 
interrupt an experimenter who had become distracted but led women to act more submissively 
and wait longer than controls. These opposite effects on behavior depended upon the gender 
stereotypical subset of self knowledge activated by the prime. The cognitive representation of 
illness proposed by the CSM is fundamentally a representation of the functionally deviant self 
(Leventhal et al., 2011). Priming an illness schema should therefore activate knowledge of the 
functionally deviant self that is associated with the prime and serve as a guide to behavior. We 
propose that an illness prime will lead people to manifest behavior consistent with illness, so 
long as a person possesses a mental representation of the symptoms and experiences associated 
with the primed illness.  
The Present Research 
Since it is important that a prime activates an existing symptomatic representation, the 
hypotheses were tested in the context of an illness with which participants might be expected to 
AUTOMATIC ILLNESS BEHAVIOR 6 
have experience, the common cold. Most people experience between two and five common 
cold episodes each year (Johnstone & Holgate, 1996). Study 1 examined participants’ 
representations of common cold symptoms in order to validate our assumption that functional 
aspects of the ‘self with a cold’ are encoded in the mental representation. To test the hypothesis 
that cold priming would lead people to behave in accordance with illness, two experiments 
(Studies 2 and 3) examined the effect of subliminally priming the common cold schema on 
subsequent behavioral responses. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants presented 
with a subliminal common cold prime would exhibit impaired walking speed (Study 2) and 
cognitive performance (Study 3) relative to controls, and that these effects would occur 
automatically, without participants being aware of the prime, nor that it had influenced their 
behavior. The final study (Study 4) sought to shed light on the boundary conditions of illness 
priming. If the effect of illness priming depends upon temporary activation of the illness 
schema in the active self concept as proposed by Wheeler et al., 2007, then activating 
alternative self-knowledge before illness priming should eliminate these effects. It was 
hypothesized that the effect of a common cold prime on cognitive performance would be 
moderated by prior activation of alternate non-illness aspects of self-knowledge. In sum we 
sought to address two questions: First, are functional deviations associated with illness encoded 
in an illness representation so that illness priming influences behavior outside of conscious 
awareness? Second, is it possible to protect the individual against illness priming? The 
university ethical committee granted ethic approval and all experimental participants signed 
consent forms and were debriefed following participation.  
Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to validate our assumption that the mental representation of 
common cold symptomology would include not only characteristic somatic symptoms but also 
functional deviation from the usual prototypical self. We expected that the common cold 
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experiential prototype would comprise multiple underlying factors representing behavioral, 
cognitive, social and emotional functionality.  
Item Generation 
  An item pool that represented the domains of subjective experience of ‘having a cold’ 
was derived from a preliminary study in which forty student participant volunteers were asked: 
“Please write a short narrative about your most recent common cold experience. Please think 
about how it felt to have the common cold. You can be as descriptive and explanatory as you 
like”. The narratives were inspected for content and all discrete self-referential statements (i.e. 
statements including the terms “I”, “My”, “Me”) that described an experiential symptom state 
associated with having a cold were retained. Our strategy in generating these items was to 
represent all experiential domains elicited by the narratives and to retain the wording as closely 
as possible to that used by the participants. A questionnaire developed containing these items 
entitled “How I feel when I have a common cold” instructed participants to respond to each 
item on a on a 7-point scale anchored from 1 (This is not at all true of me when I have a 
common cold) to 7 (This is very true of me when I have a common cold).  
Factor Structure 
  The questionnaire containing the 58 preliminary items was presented to an independent 
sample of 970 participants recruited either via notices posted around campus, classes, or from 
amongst visitors to university open days (63% female, M age = 27.81, SD = 12.03). 
Participants completed either a paper version (79%) of the questionnaire or were sent an 
electronic version by email (21%). Age and gender of participants did not vary by mode of 
distribution of the questionnaire (Age, t (968) = 1.42, p = .156; gender, χ2 (1) = 2.96, p = .097). 
Following Costello & Osborne’s (2005) recommendations the resulting data were 
subjected to an exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation with oblimin 
rotation. Results revealed 9 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Inspection of the pattern 
matrix suggested seven interpretable factors each with several high loading items. After 
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removal of free-standing items not associated with one of these seven factors, further analyses 
using maximum likelihood estimation with oblimin rotation with the number of factors to be 
retained for rotation set at 6, 7 and 8 suggested that the cleanest solution (items loadings above 
.30, no cross loadings and no factors with fewer than 5 items) was a 6 factor structure. Parallel 
analysis (Velicer & Jackson, 1990) with raw data permutation was performed in SPSS using 
O’Connor’s (2000) RawPar script in order to confirm the optimum factor solution. A 95th 
percentile distribution and 1000 permutations were selected. Six of the observed eigenvalues 
were greater than the 95th percentile values of the randomly permuted data (factor 7 observed 
eigenvalue = 1.259 < 95th percentile value = 1.298) confirming that a 6-factor solution was 
appropriate. The six factors each comprised 5 or more items with item loadings ranging from 
0.3 to .86. The six factors can be summarized as cognitive symptoms (e.g. “I have difficulty 
concentrating”; “I find it hard to put mental effort into anything”), social identity (e.g. “I feel 
other people look down on me”; “I feel unattractive”; “I feel different from other people”),  
behavioral symptoms (e.g. “I can’t walk very far”; “I find it difficult to move about”), 
respiratory symptoms (e.g. “My nose is blocked”; “My sense of smell is decreased”), systemic 
symptoms (e.g. “ I have a headache”; I feel shaky”; “I have nausea” ) and negative mood (e.g. “ 
I feel annoyed”; “I feel upset”; “I feel irritated”) (Appendix A). 
Discussion 
Results confirmed our assumption derived from the CSM that the symptom identity 
associated with the common cold would be characterized by self-perceptions of functional 
deviation from the usual prototypical self.  Six facets were identified, representing cognitive, 
social, behavioral, systemic, respiratory and emotional components of common cold illness 
self-identity.  
Study 2 
Results of Study 1 indicated that lethargy may be a key symptom experienced when 
suffering from a common cold. Study 2 tested the hypothesis based on Leventhal et al.’s CSM 
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that activation of a common cold schema might also activate typical behavioral manifestations 
of illness. We hypothesized that the activation of the common cold illness schema using a 
subliminal prime would lead participants to walk more slowly than controls. We investigated 
this possibility using a subliminal prime and an electronic system to objectively and 
surreptitiously capture walking speed. 
Method 
Design and participants. A single independent variable between groups (cold prime vs. 
control) experimental design was employed to test the hypothesis. The prime was delivered 
subliminally. Participants were 53 volunteers from the university participant pool (men = 16, 
women = 37, Mage = 27.83, SD = 10.93) who volunteered to participate in a study of “visual 
acuity”. It was important that participants remained naïve to the study purpose throughout the 
experiment in order to test the hypothesized effects of activation of the schema outside of 
conscious awareness. The participants were native English speakers and were reimbursed £3 
for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or 
control condition. Participants currently suffering from a common cold were excluded 
following data collection. 
Materials and equipment. The presentation of the subliminal prime was controlled by an 
Apple Macintosh computer and presented on a 14-inch color monitor. The experiment was 
generated using the “Superlab” version 4.0.6 computer program and comprised a subliminal 
prime embedded within an ostensible visual acuity task. 
Subliminal prime. Because the word cold is semantically ambiguous, an alternate one-
word prime was required to activate the common cold schema. Following Henderson et al. 
(2009) the word flu was adopted. Henderson et al. (2009) reported two pilot studies 
demonstrating that the word flu is highly associated with the common cold, unambiguous when 
spelled, and used synonymously with the “common cold’ in everyday speech. The 
experimental prime consisted of the word ‘FLU’, presented subliminally, with a presentation 
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time of 17ms (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Henderson et al., 2009). In the control condition, 
participants were presented with the stimulus ‘XXX’ so that the length of the subliminal 
stimulus was matched in the experimental and control groups. The prime was presented using a 
backward and forward mask, containing a random letter string (XQFBZRMQBX) that covers a 
variety of letter patterns and is structurally similar to the letters contained in the stimulus word. 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2014). The forward and backward masked prime appeared as a ‘flash’ on 
either the upper left, upper right, lower left or lower right (25 times in each corner) of the 
screen for 60ms. Participants were required to indicate whether the ‘flash’ had appeared on the 
left or right of the screen by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard (the keys ‘a’ and ‘l, 
labeled “left” and “right”, respectively).  
Walking speed. Walking speed from the computer cubicle was recorded in seconds over a 
10m distance using infra-red sensors (Brower Wireless Sprint System 2007TM) covertly 
embedded in the corridor walls. 
Procedure. A plausible scenario was developed requiring participants to walk the distance 
between the sensors embedded in the corridor wall after completing the computer task. 
Participants were tested individually. The participant was asked to attend a testing room and to 
complete a standard consent form. The experimenter explained that due to building works in 
the department it was necessary to use a different quieter experimental cubicle for the 
experiment. They were informed that the cubicle was small and they should leave any 
belongings in the original testing room before going to the cubicle and that the testing room 
door would be locked. This procedure ensured that all participants would walk back 
unencumbered by a coat or bag and reduce the likelihood of interference. Participants were 
then directed to the cubicle and asked to take a seat in front of a computer with “right” and 
“left” labels attached to the ‘a’ and ‘l’ keys on the keyboard. In order that the experimenter 
remained blind to condition, participants were asked to watch a video controlled by a simple 
Supercard® program that would explain how to run the experiment. The participant was told 
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that when the experimenter left the room, they were to watch the video and follow the 
instructions on the screen and once they had finished, return to the original testing room where 
the experimenter would meet them to complete a questionnaire. Once the participant was ready 
to begin, the experimenter left the cubicle and returned to the original testing room to avoid 
influencing the participant as he or she emerged from the cubicle to walk back to the testing 
room.   
Prime and control participants were presented with identical on-screen instructions. 
Participants were instructed that they would see a fixation cross in the center of the screen that 
they were to look at, followed by a string of letters that would ‘flash’ briefly at the top right, 
top left, bottom right or bottom left of the screen. When the flash disappeared their task was to 
indicate whether the flash had appeared on the left or the right side of the screen by pressing 
either the ‘l’ key to indicate right, or the ‘a’ key to indicate left. Participants were instructed to 
keep looking at the center of the screen where the fixation cross would appear throughout the 
task, and to be as quick and accurate as possible. The final screen prompted participants to 
return to the previous testing room. As the participant walked from the cubicle to the testing 
room, their walking speed between the two points was automatically recorded via the infrared 
sensors embedded in the wall. On reaching the testing room, the experimenter conducted a 
funneled debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2014) to test for participants’ awareness of 
the primes in an unobtrusive way. Participants answered a series of questions that varied in 
their specificity. Initial questions concerned awareness of the purpose of the study and 
subsequent questions checked for recognition of the subliminal priming stimuli and awareness 
of walking speed assessment. No participant reported being aware of the subliminally 
presented words, being aware that their walking speed had been measured, or suspicion about 
the purpose of the study. At this point demographic information was recorded and participants 
were asked if they were currently suffering from a common cold, before being fully debriefed 
about the purpose of the study and the surreptitious recording of walking speed and thanked.  
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Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Data from four participants was excluded because they were 
suffering from a current cold (n=3) or the sensor failed to record walking time (n=1), leaving a 
final sample of 49 (men = 16, women = 33; M age = 28.18, SD = 11.19), 25 controls and 24 in 
the prime condition. Randomization checks confirmed that men and women were equally 
distributed across conditions, Χ2 (1) = 1.25, p = .263, and there was no age difference between 
conditions, t (47) = -.14, p = .892. Walking speed data were moderately skewed and were log 
transformed prior to analysis. 
Effect of the cold prime on walking speed. It was hypothesized that participants exposed 
to the subliminal cold prime would walk more slowly than controls after leaving the laboratory. 
Means and standard deviations and a t–test of the non-transformed walking speeds are shown 
in the upper portion of Table 1. Cold primed participants walked more slowly than controls, a 
moderate effect size according to Cohen’s (1992) criteria.  
Consistent with hypothesis, subliminal activation of the common cold resulted in 
participants walking slower relative to control participants. We viewed this as evidence that 
activation of the common cold schema led to activation of behavioral aspects of the common 
cold symptom prototype. Another experiment with a different dependent measure sought to 
replicate the finding with respect to a different component of common cold symptomology. 
Study 3 
Study 1 showed that the functional representation of a common cold includes a lack of 
mental energy and difficulties in concentrating. Study 3 tested the hypothesis that subliminal 
activation of a common cold schema might result in performance deficits on a memory task. 
Method 
Design and participants. A single independent variable between groups (cold prime vs. 
control) experimental design was employed to test the effect of a subliminally presented prime 
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on cognitive performance. Participants were students and staff from the university participant 
pool (N = 30, men = 13, women = 17; Mage = 33.00, SD = 12.64) who volunteered to 
participate in a study of cognitive processes. The participants were native English speakers and 
were reimbursed £3 for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
experimental or control condition.  
Materials and equipment. 
Subliminal prime. The backward and forward masked experimental prime (FLU) and the 
control (XXX) were exactly as in study 2. However in this experiment, the prime and its masks 
were embedded in a free recall task and were presented at the beginning of each trial, 
immediately before the presentation of each word in the recall task. 
Free recall memory task. A free-recall memory task served as a measure of cognitive 
performance (e.g. Murdock, 1962; Bhatarah, Ward & Tan, 2006). Participants are shown a list 
of words that they are required to consciously encode and subsequently retrieve from memory 
(i.e. remember and recall). Participants must use cognitive effort to remember the words, 
particularly when the words are unrelated to any salient concepts, making it an appropriate task 
to test diminished cognitive function when the illness schema is activated. Three, twenty-four 
word lists were created. The words were selected at random from the Toronto Word Pool 
(Friendly et al., 1982), and matched across the three lists for number of nouns, verbs and 
adjectives and for frequency and length using the Celex database (Baayen, Piepenbrock & van 
Rijn, 1993). Three psychology faculty also inspected the lists and excluded words related to 
illness, speed, accuracy or memory. The word lists were presented, one word at a time, in three 
blocks of 24 words each. The prime and its masks appeared for 60ms immediately before the 
presentation of each word. Each word was presented in lower case Arial font size 24 and 
appeared six millimeters high in the center of the screen. The words were presented for one 
second each, followed by a 500ms blank screen.  
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Procedure. Participants were tested individually. Each participant was shown to a testing 
cubicle where the experimenter asked him or her to complete a standard consent form before 
explaining the upcoming task. The experimenter placed a pen and three blank sheets of paper 
labeled List A, List B and List C on the desk beside the keyboard. In order that the 
experimenter remained blind to condition, participants were asked to watch a video controlled 
by a simple Supercard® program that would explain how to run the experiment. The participant 
was told that after the researcher left the room, they were to read the instructions on the 
computer screen and push any key to begin the task. The instructions were identical for the 
experimental prime and control conditions. Participants were instructed to look at the center of 
the screen throughout the task where they would see a string of letters ‘flash’ in the center of 
the screen followed by a word. Participants were asked to try to remember each word and told 
that they would be asked to write down as many as they could remember. The instructions 
informed participants that they would see three sets of words, ‘List A’, ‘List B’ and ‘List C’ 
and at the end of each list there would be a break and they would be given an opportunity to 
write down as many words from that list as they could remember. Following presentation of 
the first twenty four words, a beep sounded and a further instruction screen asked the 
participant to take the sheet of paper labeled ‘List A’ from the pile and to list as many words as 
they could following the sound of the next beep. After 60 seconds recall time, another beep 
sounded and a new instruction screen appeared informing participants that they should stop 
writing and put the list to one side. They were told they would now see List B words as soon as 
they pushed any key to continue. This procedure continued until the participant had listed the 
words from List C. After completing the free recall task, the final screen prompted participants 
to call the experimenter who conducted a funneled debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand,  
2014). Participants were asked a series of questions that varied in specificity from initial 
questions concerning the purpose of the study followed by questions checking for recognition 
of the prime stimuli. Data from 1 participant was subsequently excluded on the basis of 
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suspicion about the task. Finally, demographic data was collected and participants were asked 
if they were currently suffering from a common cold, before being fully debriefed and thanked.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Data from six participants who reported currently having a 
common cold, and from one participant whose recall score was an outlier (>M+3SDs) was 
discarded, leaving a final sample of 22 (men = 9, women = 13; Mage = 33.52, SD = 12.25), 11 
controls and 11 in the prime group. Randomization checks confirmed that there was no age 
difference between conditions, t (20) = -.85, p = .408. However, men were over-represented in 
the prime group, Χ 2 (1) = 4.70, p = .030. Preliminary analysis of this possible source of 
systematic bias showed that gender was unrelated to word recall (t (20) = -.981, p = .338) so 
was not considered further. The mean number of recalled words from all three lists served as 
the dependent measure.  
Effect of the prime on word recall. It was hypothesized that participants exposed to the 
subliminal cold prime would recall fewer words. Means and standard deviations of the recalled 
words are given in the lower portion of Table 1. A t-test confirmed that cold primed 
participants recalled fewer words than those in the control condition, a large effect size 
according to Cohen’s (1992) criteria. 
Consistent with hypotheses, subliminal activation of the common cold resulted in poorer 
word recall consistent with impaired cognitive performance. Studies 2 and 3 provide evidence 
of behavioral consequences of subliminal activation of a common cold illness schema. 
Study 4 
Studies two and three demonstrated that priming the common cold outside of conscious 
awareness led to behavioral and cognitive deficiency that is consistent with an active cold 
schema. Following Wheeler et al. (2007) it was theorized that the subliminal prime would exert 
behavioral effects because it temporarily activated specific knowledge including behavioral 
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schema associated with the prime. At the moment of priming, the association between the 
prime and knowledge about the functionally deviant self contained in the illness schema 
become the central component of the active self and guided behavior. The final experiment was 
designed to test the hypothesis that activating alternate aspects of the chronic self concept 
might help to protect participants against illness priming. We theorized that priming alternate 
aspects of the self-concept that are unrelated and antagonistic to illness schema content would 
reduce the effects of subsequent illness priming. It was hypothesized that priming alternate self 
knowledge prior to the illness prime would moderate the consequences of an illness prime on 
cognitive performance. This final study also included a measure of self-reported fatigue in 
completing the recall task as an additional check on the non conscious mediation of participant 
responses.  
Method 
Design and participants. A 2 (illness schema activation: common cold prime vs. control) 
X 2 (self-identity activation: positive self prime vs. control) between participant design was 
used to test the hypothesis. The common cold prime was subliminal, whereas the identity 
prime was supraliminal. Participants were 66 undergraduate students (19 men; 47 women; 
Mage = 21.76, SD = 7.63) who volunteered to participate in two ostensibly unrelated studies 
that would run consecutively. The participants were native English speakers and were 
reimbursed £5 in advance for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
the experimental or control conditions.  
Materials and equipment. The experiments were controlled by an Apple Macintosh 
computer and presented on a 14-inch color monitor. The experiment was generated using the 
“Superlab” version 4.0.6 computer program and comprised two ostensibly unrelated tasks; a 
supraliminal prime for an alternate sense of self followed by the free recall memory task with 
an embedded subliminal cold prime identical to that used in Study 3. Word recall from the 
second task served as the dependent variable. 
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 Alternate self prime. To create a plausible but subtle procedure that would enable us to 
activate aspects of the self concept not related to illness, we adapted a procedure from the 
Klee-Kandinsky painting preference task (e.g. Gaertner & Insko, 2000) in which participants 
are given feedback based upon their ostensible artistic preferences. Participants were asked to 
rate a series of 20 art images presented in random order. Each image was presented on the 
screen together with a Likert scale anchored by 1 (I don’t like this image at all) and 6 (I like 
this image very much) and remained on the screen until the participant made a response. These 
responses were recorded but were irrelevant to the feedback that followed. Following the 
assessment of the 20 images, the supraliminal prime (alternate self vs. control) was presented. 
Participants in the alternate self condition were told that their scores relating to the extent to 
which they liked the images had revealed that they stated preferences for “Taylor” art. Those 
people expressing preference for “Taylor” pictures were described in generally positively 
terms, as people who are relatively high achievers, find it easy to make friends, who are easy-
going and tend to be successful. Another screen then appeared and participants were asked to 
agree/disagree with 5 statements about being a “Taylor” (e.g. “I like being considered a 
member of the Taylor group” I am pleased to be a ‘Taylor’”) on a Likert scale from 1 
(disagree) to 5 (agree). Participants in the control condition saw a screen with a paragraph 
giving some information about art. 
Subliminal cold prime. The subliminal common cold prime was embedded in a free recall 
task exactly as described in Study 3. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Participants were shown into a testing cubicle that 
housed a desk-mounted computer where they completed a standard consent form and the 
experimenter explained the upcoming task. A questionnaire measure of task related fatigue was 
placed face-down on the desk next to the computer and three sheets of paper labeled List A, 
List B and List C were presented to the participant on the desk before them. The participant 
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was told that after the researcher left the room, they were to begin the first computer task 
followed by the second, unrelated, task. Participants were asked to read the instructions on the 
computer screen and push any key to begin the task. The instruction screens were identical for 
both the experimental prime and control conditions. Instructions for the first task asked 
participants to rate their liking for a series of images. After rating the last image, participants 
assigned to the positive self-identity prime condition viewed the screens relating to being a 
‘Taylor’, while control group participants read a screen displaying information about art. The 
next screen instructed all participants to press any key to continue to the second task, whereby 
the instruction screen for the free recall memory task appeared, as described in Study 3. 
After completing the free recall task, the final screen prompted participants to complete the 
questionnaire that had been placed face down on the desk. The experimenter then conducted a 
funneled debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2014) to test for participants’ awareness of 
the true purpose of the task, whether they perceived any connection between the two ostensibly 
unrelated tasks and whether they were able to report recognition of the subliminal prime 
stimuli. Data from one participant was subsequently excluded on the basis of suspicion about 
the task. Demographic information was then collected and the participant was asked if he or 
she was currently suffering from a common cold, before being fully debriefed and thanked.  
Questionnaire measure 
The questionnaire completed directly after the free recall task measured self-reported 
fatigue (α = .75). This scale included eight items (e.g. “How difficult did you find it to perform 
the task?” “How tiring was it to perform the task?”). Responses were made on seven point 
Likert scales with anchors 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Data from 15 participants was excluded because they reported 
currently having a common cold, data from 3 participants whose word recall scores were 
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outliers was excluded1, leaving 47 participants data for analysis (men = 15; women = 32; M 
age = 21.47, SD = 7.13) (Group sizes: 12,12,12,11). Randomization checks confirmed that men 
and women were equally distributed across the prime and control groups (alternate self prime 
vs. control group Χ2 (1) = .045, p = .831; common cold prime vs. control Χ2 (1) = .704, p = 
.401), and that there was no age difference across conditions (alternate self prime vs. control 
group t (45) = .193, p = .848; common cold prime vs. control group t (45) = .704, p = .401).  
Inspection of the data concerning attitudes towards the art images presented in the first task 
showed that these ratings were unrelated to recall in the subsequent task (r (47) = -.002, p = 
.989). ANOVA confirmed that there were no differences in artistic attitudes across conditions; 
there were non-significant main effects of self-prime and cold prime and the interaction term 
(F (1,43) = 1.48, p = .231; .303, p = .585; .008, p = .929, respectively).  Participants in the self-
prime condition reported generally favorable views of being a ‘Taylor’  (M = 3.46, SD = 1.14). 
A 2 (Self-identity activation: alternate self prime vs. control) X 2 (illness schema activation: 
common cold prime vs. control) between participants ANOVA confirmed that fatigue did not 
differ by condition; there were non-significant main effects of self-prime and cold prime and 
the interaction term (F (1,43) = .07, p = .787;  .135, p = .251; 1.50, p = .227, respectively).  
Effect of common cold and positive self primes on word recall. The mean number of 
recalled words from all three lists served as the dependent measure. A 2 (self-identity 
activation: alternate self prime vs. control) X 2 (illness schema activation: common cold prime 
vs. control) between participants ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the common cold 
                                                
1 An alternative way to manage outliers is to conduct a nonparametric bootstrapping analysis of the data set 
including outliers (N = 50). This analysis revealed the same pattern of results. ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of cold prime (F (1, 46) = 4.90, p = .032), a non-significant main effect of alternate self prime (F 
(1,46) = .00, p = .996) and a significant interaction of cold prime and self prime (F (1,46) = 5.64, p = .022). 
Inspection of bootstrapped (1000 bootstrapping resamples) 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the mean recall 
scores showed that the confidence interval between cold primed and control participants did not include zero 
(95% CI [.165, 1.942]) so that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level. For the comparison of self 
primed participants with controls, the confidence interval included zero (95% CI [-.964, .971]) consistent with the 
non-significant result from the ANOVA. Bootstrapped comparisons of simple effects showed that for participants 
who were not primed with an alternate self, the cold prime was associated with lower recall (95% CI [1.149, 
3.186) so that the null hypothesis can be rejected, consistent with the result from study 3. When primed with an 
alternate self, the cold prime no longer influenced recall (95% CI [-1.38, 1.22]). Participants primed with the cold 
after an alternate self prime recalled more words than those primed with the cold only (95% CI [-2.12, -.079]). 
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prime (F (1,43) = 4.53, p = .039, ηp2 = .095) that was qualified by a significant interaction of 
cold prime and alternate self (F (1,43) = 6.74, p = .013, ηp2 = .14). The main effect of the 
alternate self prime was non significant (F (1,43) = 0.52, p = .476, ηp2 = .01). Means and 
standard deviations of the correctly recalled words are displayed in Table 2. Analyses of simple 
effects indicated that for participants who were not primed with an alternate self, priming with 
the common cold was associated with lower word recall as compared to controls (Table 2: 
bottom row). This finding replicates the observation from Study 3. More important for the 
current hypothesis, when participants were primed with an alternate self, the common cold 
prime no longer influenced word recall (Table 2: top row). Participants primed with the 
common cold after an alternate self prime recalled more words than those primed with the 
common cold only (Table 2: column 1).  
 Findings from Study 4 showed that an alternate self prime was effective in reducing the 
effect of common cold schema activation on behavioral manifestation of illness, specifically 
cognitive performance as measured by a free-recall memory task. The effect occurred without 
participants being aware of the cold prime, or of its influence.  
General Discussion 
The primary goal of the research was to test the hypothesis that functional components of 
symptom experience are encoded in implicit illness representations so that subliminal 
activation of an illness schema activates behavioral manifestations of illness. Findings from 
four studies reported in the current article lend support to this suggestion. After confirming that 
people represent common cold experience in functional terms (Study 1), significant effects of a 
subliminal prime on behavioral and cognitive functional deviations associated with the 
common cold were observed (Studies 2 and 3). Specifically, individuals in whom the common 
cold illness schema was temporarily activated demonstrated significantly slower walking speed 
and significantly poorer performance on a cognitively demanding task. These effects were 
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reliably observed across two different behavioral contexts using objective behavioral measures 
and replicated in Study 4. Moreover, these effects were observed without participants being 
aware that the illness schema had been activated, nor that their behavior had been influenced. 
Study 4 also showed that the effect of activating the illness schema on cognitive performance 
was moderated by the prior activation of alternate self-knowledge not associated with illness.  
The present studies extend previous research concerning activation of implicit illness 
concepts by demonstrating that schema activation outside of conscious awareness can produce 
deficits in behavioral performance that are consistent with an illness prototype, in people who 
have no objective pathology. We theorized that an illness schema as described by the CSM is 
essentially a mental representation of the functionally deviant self. Following Wheeler et al’s 
(2007) active self account, we propose that these behavioral effects were observed because the 
prime temporarily activated knowledge of the functionally deviant self contained in the illness 
schema associated with the prime. Since the active self is an important guide to current 
behavior, participants subsequently demonstrated behavioral manifestations of illness.  
Behavioral and cognitive slowness is consistent with the behavioral consequences of immune 
system activity in the body, and with the induced avoidance of exertion brought about by the 
immune system whilst fighting infection (Eccles, 2000). Since symptoms might therefore be 
considered a part of the self-regulation process associated with illness it is explicable that this 
active self-regulation process, implicitly represented by behavioral and cognitive lethargy, 
impacted upon the task of walking back to the experimenter’s testing room, and engaging in a 
cognitively demanding task, even without participant awareness.  
Might an illness prime also automatically activate self-regulatory behaviors such as 
medication use or seeking medical help? Henderson et al (2009) showed that subliminal 
priming activated coping strategy concepts (such as ‘lozenge’) associated with an illness prime, 
but only amongst habitual users of the strategy in that context (i.e. when suffering from a 
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common cold) in the past. It is therefore plausible that a prime might lead to self-management 
behavior (adaptive or maladaptive) that is encoded with an illness provided that an individual 
possesses a behavioral script for the strategy (cf. Leventhal et al., 2011). Mere knowledge of 
recommended action is unlikely to be sufficient for behavioral responses to occur 
automatically and without conscious intent.  While present studies capitalized upon common 
misrepresentations of ‘flu’ as merely a ‘bad cold’ in order to overcome ambiguity in the 
meaning of the word ‘cold’, cold-specific versus flu-specific primes would be needed for 
subsequent research on priming behaviors such as flu vaccination (e.g. Chapman & Coups, 
2006).   
Present findings regarding an, albeit minor illness, support the view that symptomatic 
deviations from the prototype of the functional self are an important component of the 
cognitive representation of disease threat. The inclusion of loss of behavioral and cognitive 
functionality in the cognitive representation of illness is consistent with literature concerning 
self-assessed health. Self-assessments of health are powerful predictors of the future onset of 
major illnesses (Idler & Benyamini, 1997) and it is self-assessments of function, not of 
emotional states that contribute to, and drive changes in self-assessed health (Mora et al, 2008, 
Leventhal et al., 2011). Changes in functional health also drive change in accessibility of 
coping information (e.g. Schuz et al., 2011). Questionnaire instruments designed to assess 
explicit illness representations might benefit from the inclusion of functional performance in 
the identity domain.  
The final study provides preliminary evidence of one process that might regulate the extent 
to which an illness prime is likely to result in behavioral manifestations of illness. We 
proposed that activation of alternate non-illness self knowledge might protect participants 
against illness priming and obtained findings in line with this proposal. Future research will 
want to explore specific types of self-knowledge and other paradigms such as self-affirmation 
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(e.g. Cohen & Sherman, 2014) that might provide insight into this protective mechanism. 
Present studies used asymptomatic samples to investigate priming effects without confounding 
by current illness or possible effects of actual illness on task performance. Nonetheless, a 
number of future research directions may be indicated by the findings. For example, it is 
possible that an active self-concept that opposes activation of an illness schema may interfere 
with or delay detecting and interpreting a deviation from the normal state of somatic 
functioning, leading to late or inappropriate self-management. Relatedly, findings raise 
interesting questions about the implications of chronic schema activation arising from 
incorporation of an illness label (identity) in the chronic self-concept (e.g. chronic fatigue 
syndrome, Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2001), and the possible role of active self-knowledge that is 
not associated with illness in protecting against adoption of a chronic illness identity. Other 
factors might also impact upon the likelihood of a prime leading directly to behavioral 
manifestations of illness. Priming behavior requires that people have experience of the primed 
category (Dijksterhuis et al., 2000). Priming a disease with which people have limited 
experience (and consequently no elaborated schema that has been repeatedly co-activated with 
symptoms) is unlikely to result in direct behavioral consequences. Another factor might be the 
specific content of the cognitive representation of illness. While illness representations are by 
their nature negatively valenced, nonetheless individual differences derived from experience, 
cultural knowledge and so on, may lead to differences in representation of consequences, 
causes, controllability and so on. For example, Henderson et al. (2007) showed that response 
latency to illness related words in a Stroop task following a prime were correlated with 
participants’ explicit representations of illness.  
As with any new area of research a number of limitations should be acknowledged. In the 
present studies, participants were tested individually and alone, with no other person present in 
the testing environment, conditions in which an illness prime is most likely to be attributed to 
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the self (Wheeler et al., 2007). Mediation by activation of self concepts associated with illness 
could not be tested in the present studies because it might have primed illness in the control 
groups. However, future research might additionally examine the self-perceptions activated by 
an illness prime to provide insight into the processes theoretically proposed to account for 
current findings. The sample sizes in the present study were relatively small, particularly in 
studies 3 and 4, although consistent effects were obtained across studies. Further research 
adopting illness priming techniques in larger populations is warranted.   
In sum, the present investigation extends understanding of the schematic nature of illness 
representations in the CSM by showing that activation outside of awareness can lead to the 
simultaneous activation of behavioral manifestations of the illness prototype. While illness 
schema are most commonly activated by detection of deviations from the normal somatic self, 
and are often brought to conscious awareness, current evidence suggests that primes in the 
environment may also in some circumstances directly activate illness.  
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Table 1. 
Mean Walking Speed (Study 2) and Word Recall (Study 3) as a Function of Cold Prime 
Dependent 
Measure 
Prime Condition Control Condition   
 M SD M SD t (p) d (CI) 
Walking speed 
(s) 
8.19 1.27 7.58 0.51 -2.21 (.032)a -0.63 (-1.21, -0.06) 
Word recall 6.76 1.87 8.55 1.39 2.54 (0.02) 1.08 (0.19, 1.98) 
Note: a. t value computed from log transformed walking speed. Non-transformed walking 
speeds are shown in the table for comprehensibility. Log transformed values were (Prime; M = 
0.91, SD = .06: Control; M = 0.88, SD = .03). 
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Table 2. 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Word Recall as a Function of Alternate Self Identity 
Prime Condition and Common Cold Prime Condition (Study 4) 
Identity 
Prime 
Condition 
Illness Prime Condition   
 Cold Prime  Control   
 M SD  M SD t(p) d (CI) 
Alternate-
Self 
8.58 1.16  8.36 1.30 -.28 (.783) -0.12 (-.094,0.702) 
Control 7.06 1.12  9.22 1.37 4.24 (<0.001) 1.73 (0.79,2.67) 
        
t (p) -3.21 
(.004) 
      
d  
(CI) 
-1.34  
(-2.25, 
-0.43) 
      
 
